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In the socialist countries, and without exaggeration, in the first 
place in Hungary there is a lively debate in progress on the interpreta­
tion of (Leterminism. Controversies are particularly shar]) in the matter 
of will and of the determination of human action. \\ hat has to he recog- 
nixed is that in this field there is not yet such a uniform or predominant 
concept of philosophy as could he accepted by the branches of science 
dealing with human behaviour or conduct and could lie interpreted and 
applied uniformly by them. Many of those devoting themselves to cri­
minology, or in general to legal sciences, attribute a high degree of signifi­
cance to the determined nature of human conduct, bccaucse the elabora­
tion of the theoretical foundations of responsibility insists on a scientific, 
materialist definition and description of the essence of human conduct. 
In particular the study of criminal liability cannot by-pass an unambi­
guous attitude to the question, inasmuch as the fate of hundreds of 
thousands offenders depends on the settlement of the problem in the one 
way or the other. The often proclaimed, vet unwritten point of view 
underrating the importance of theory according to which it is wholly 
immaterial for the offender whether he is convicted from a determinist 
or indeterminist outlook, is on the whole erroneous.
The kind of punishment, its contents, the methods of the enforcement 
of the punishment, the regime are all defined by the underlying theory.
The system of punishment is ad justed to what has been set as the objec­
tive, the purpose of punishment: is it retaliation, or prevention with an 
educative end, or the combination of the two.
The discovery of the laws of human beha viour are about as important 
for us as that of the laws of natural phenomena. The determinist appro- 
ache to human conduct may, if we resort to a simile, lead to consequences 
of as vital importance as the change-over from the geocentric outlook to 
the heliocentric. The Ptolemaic geocentric outlook too permitted men to 
take tlur bearings as directed by the stars in their courses. It was posssible 
to establish the length of the year with tolerable accuracy, still the geo­
centric outlook failed to give a proper reply to many of the questions the
Universe put to tnankind. Hven after the hirth of the Copernican tenets 
the question could he ashed (anti perhaps was ashed), what profit man- 
hind could derive from the rejection of the geocentric outlooh and from 
proclaiming that the earth was turning round the sun. Today, centuries 
after the hirth of the Uopernican laws rochets and other spacecrafts are 
orbiting in space and. man could even land on another celestial bodv. 
in our opinion the recognition of determinism anti its consistent enforce­
ment in human conduct will sooner or later result revolutionary results in 
human conduct, in education, in the relations of men among themselves 
and it) the formation of social conditions. It wilt be at that time that 
Alarxisni. the materialist outlooh. will unfold itself in its totality and 
jmt their stamp on an epoch of society, on a social formation embracing 
qualitatively new human relations.
The determinist approach to the conduct of the criminal therefore 
grows in its significance beyond the frameworh of criminal justice, it 
serves as guidance for the treatment of offences constituting minor rishs 
only to society, and influences judgements formed of human behaviour 
in general.
A new interpreration of determinism and attempts to transplant it 
into the sphere of legal liability on the ground of Vlarxist philosophy 
dates bach to the early "sixties." Kxcellent monographs were publishe 
in succession.* whose authors consistently attired what they had to sav 
in a determinist guise, and accordingly formulated their notions of res­
ponsibility.
At present with the emergence of causality anti t he idea of imprison­
ment for a term indefinite the debate on the d<Acrmincdncss of human 
conduct has revived. This del tat e has to a con-id'table extent advanced 
the process of crystallization of the criminological approach, yet it has 
had a fertilising effect also on other branches of < i iminologv. in so far as 
it has reinforced the materialist outlooh. Although the debate passes off as 
the discussion of the interppretation of determinism, in our opinion herc 
materialism anti determinism wage their struggle against idealist iudetcr- 
minist opinions, or their remnants. The debate manifest itself as one on 
interpretation, because in the course of phenomena the domination of 
determination has been recognized by all. anti all confess themselves 
materialists. Still there are differences as to the degree and form of deter­
minism. Consequently in the following we shall forgo to offer a definition 
of the notion of determinism, and confute ourselves to the exposition of 
our point of view in association with a few fundamental concepts and 
mooted questions of major importance.
I. Action of determinism
The statement H. Kerch has made, viz. that "The affirmation of the 
principle of causality will lead directly to determinism" appears to be 
confirmed in every respect.- In fact the study of the causes in the back-
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ground of deiitipuency will hel]i to understand the principle of determi­
nism mid even to accept it.
Tiie study of the criminal human conduct, of the causes of delin- 
<)uency and its laws is closely associated witii the setticnicnt of the severa! 
questions witiiin tiie notional s[ihere of determinism. Determinism on the 
other hand is inseparably interreiated witii the essentia] theses of mate- 
riaiism. so e. g. with the principle of the material unity of the f adverse, 
to tiie exclusion of anything supernatural. with the infinity and the motion 
of the material L'nivcrse. and the capacity of conscious human activity 
to shape nature.
The approach to determinism from the part of causaiitv wiil infall- 
ihiy call for the ciarificatiou of tiie interrelations of tiie two concepts, 
viz. determinism and causality. As regards causaiitv essentially any 
effect, and so also the criminal offence, is defined hy causes and condi­
tions.
fn tiie most generaiixed phiiosophic formulation determinism may he 
defined as the idea formed of tiie universai definition of natural, social 
and psychic phenomena. Dr in other word the term "determinism" is 
used to denote the schools or doctrines of philosophy which rccognixc the 
existence of a determination or regularity as tiie existence of a deter­
mination or regularity as tiie result of interrelations and interactions.-'
Textbooks of philosophy or comprehensive monographs as a rule 
draw tiie notions of causaiitv. interreiations. regularity, necessity, rand­
om, probahiiity, possibility, contents and form into the orbit of deter­
minism. Xotwithstanding the treatment of determinism in general boils 
down to tiie study of causality and reguiarity, further of tiie necessary 
and random, probable and possible relations.
This stands to reason inasmuch as these are the most essential inter­
relations of determinism.
Dealing with causality we have come to tiie conclusion that causality 
belongs to the sphere of tiie past, the relation between cause and effect 
continue their existence witiiin phenomena already in being, and tiie 
regularities manifestingthemseives in these phenomena become projected 
to the future, and render probable tiie recurrence of tiie phenomena in thc 
future. in tiie present tiie factors of causaiitv are merely in a relation of 
probability witii the potentiaiities of tiie future. A causal relation possible 
to turn up in the future may therefore be considered a probable relation, 
in this rotation there are not yet tiie effects: they will come into being as 
soon as anyone of the potentialities becomes rcaiitv. i. e. it is transferred 
to tiie province of tiie past (present). And vice versa, tiie relations of tiie 
¡last have ceased to bo probable, there being no more potentialities in tiie 
[iast. Xo sooner anyone of these potentialities has become a reality, all 
others have ceased to exist as potentialities. It is in this wav that multi- 
nmltiscnse relations existing independent of time become in reality 
(in the present), in the past in the casual relations, a multi-unisense 
detcrniindedness.
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As mnv he seen in the interpretation of causality a highly important 
role has been attributed to the time factor, to the separation of past and 
future. On the other hand determinism as the principle of universal deter­
mination is equally valid for the happenings of past and future indepen­
dently of the progress of time. The relations of the future, the possible 
and probable relations belong to determination in the same way as those 
of the past. Therefore in our opinion the backbone of determination is 
made up of the casual, regular, random, possible and probable relations. 
On this understanding /Ac c.s.scMce o/ Je/erw?/?*/#?# MMt,y (/e/Ywed ¿w /Ac 
3/a/cM;ea/ /An/ /Ac pAcMmac?;'? oacc Accowc rcc/i/y nrc r/c/cra/iacr/ /A/vnn/A 
/Ac cAu/a o/ rega/nr na7 rn/a/o/a rn.sau/ ia/crrc/a/ma.s- A// caa.scg aac/ coadi- 
/ioa.s q/' accc.s.sa'///. a Acrca.s /Ac/a/?oc ^Acacaacaa fa.s- oac or /Ac o/Arr o/'powi- 
/a'/i/ic.spl a ;7/ Accoaie dc/cradacd ;'a a .sa'ao'Ao a-ng a/ /Ac aaaac/g a/' Arrow,ba/ 
/ca/i/y.
Of thus notional definition for our part we attribute considerable 
importance to the repeated delineation of the notion of necessity, it is 
almost impossible to emphasize in a sufficentlv conclusive manner how 
important it is in criminology the correct interpretation of the necessary, 
the regular and the random for the understanding of the problems of 
delinquency.
For our part we have adopted the position taken by Fbldesi, who 
resolved, the abstract notion of necessity into the notions of the regular 
and random. In delinquency, as far as the criminal human conduct is 
concern, this interpretation appears to be confirmed by facts. Accord­
ingly any phenomenon has and will come to pass of necessity, still there 
are some among them which take place bv some sort of regularity, whereas 
ot Iters are of random occurence, if viewed from a definite angle.
Thus the random has not to be confronted with the necessary, in 
fact a random phenomenon is also one of necessity. Random mav. how­
ever. be confronted by the regular, which in like way is of necessity. 
In a definite relation random and regular are mutually exclusive notions. 
The one or the other phenomenon studied in the same system must be 
either one of regularity or one of random, t he notion of determinism is 
before all attached to the notion of the necessary. The phenomena have 
come to pass of necessity, and as the resultants of causes and conditions 
will come into being in the same way also, in the future. Within this orbit 
of necessity there are, however, phenomena which are the effects of 
regular causal relations, and others, which are random like. The regular 
phenomena manifest themselves in the frequency of the causal factors 
or constellations.
Of the future potentialities in the first place those will become rcality 
or manifest themselves in human conduct, which according to the laws 
in this scope may be termed as probable. Phenomena which in the past 
came into being in conformity with strict regularities, will most probably 
occur in the future too, with a high degree of probability. Essentially, 
however, the laws or regularities will dominate in the future also only as-
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tendencies. Random etemcnts will to a higher or lesser decree influence 
tlieir effects.
fho cumulation of random phenomena, their increasing rate of 
recurrence, will impair the domination of the laws or regularities, and 
hevond a certain limit the law or regularity will cease to exist only to 
yield to a new regularity prevailing in phenomena earlier qualified as 
random events. One of them is a question of ethnology and is due to the 
Hungarian usage. The words "determination" or "determinism" are 
replaced in Hungarian by the word "meghataroxottsag" i. e. "determined­
ness" which suggests something referring to the past, though we use this 
phrase — as to its sense — concerning future phenomena as well. 
"Human conduct is determined, defined." Owing to semantic peculiarities 
this formulation may be understood so that a future conduct is already 
predetermined in tlie present, determinism being a universal category. 
Thus this interpretation in fact contains prc-determinacy, predestination. 
Therefore such formulation tiad better be avoided, and instead the proper 
course would be to declare that the principle of determinacy, of deter­
minism is valid also for human conducts, or that any human conduct in 
the past is defined, determined, anil any future conduct will become defined, 
determined. Or if we use these established expressions, they are wort!) 
referring to their contents in a sentence.
The other notional problem centres round the question whether 
the notion od determinism may stand without at) adjective or epithet. 
This question emerges from several aspects. First it emerges it) a way 
whether it is to distinguish determinism from the mechanical determinist 
tendencies developed in the course of history the epithet dialectic may be 
placed before it. A similar problem of delimitation emerges in connection 
with the negation of the freedom of will, whether for the delimitation from 
the divine determination the use of theepithet materialist is more prefer­
able. l)i our opinion these epithets may be convenient from time to 
time, still in genera! their use is not justified, because hardly any talk of 
determinism occurs without references to the contents of the concept 
with the idea what determinism meant on the given occasion. More sense 
is in using the materialist antonyms, etc., i. e. when we speak or write of a 
determinism different from materialist. Still the use of the epithet may 
emerge again when it comes to convey an idea of the degree of determi­
nation. Often terms such as relative determinedness, or cosistent deter- 
minedness cat) be heard. Since in our opinion there is only a single sort of 
determinacy, which may be either accepted or ¡ejected, it makes useless 
either of the two epithets. The difference between the two epithets is 
onlv that the epithet "consistent" does not indicate a change in the essence 
of determinedness, whereas the epithet "relative" implies the meaning 
of indeterminedness. This has been formulated with exceptional clarity 
bv Endre Farkas, when he writes that "Marxist philosophy on analysing 
the facts of reality, and by using the results of the specialised branches 
of science excepts the dialectic determinist thesis according to which all 
objects, phenomena and processes of the material world, and anyone of
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them, are directly or indirectly determined by material factors. Thcrc 
are no exceptions to this determinedness: it is equally valid for organic 
and inorganic nature, and so also for the social and psychological proces­
ses. Therefore according to it neither in the material world nor within 
human nature exists anything life mystic factor, which by self-excitation 
would exercise an effect on either itself or the material world. Renee 
from consistent materialist monism in a straight line follows the consis­
tent determinism anti vice versa: consistent determinism leads to mate­
rialism. In contradistinction to this even an inkling of indeterminism will 
eventually lead to a mystical factor, so to idealism, and idealism wilt 
always reach indeterminism in one way or other, Materialst dialectic 
determinism applied to human action, carried through consistcntlv. 
will become the refutation of the indetermined mystical idea of the free­
dom of will".'
2. The chances of the freedom of choice
In reality it is the problem of the freedom of will. Here controversies 
or divergent opinions are clashing most intenselv.
The dispute is focussed mostly on the chance of a choice, or thc 
freedom of a choice.
in connection with the freedom of choice the quest ion in general is 
whether a person has got freedom in preferring one of the possible actions 
to another, or whether there is any possibility of choice at all. when human 
conduct, too, is determined. The analysis of causality, as we have carried 
it through, in its outcome has helped to bring out views on phenomena 
belonging to the sphere of the past, as phenomena already materialized, 
to a conclusion, because these phenomena as effects have to the full extent 
been determined or defined by the causes and conditions, and moav now be 
considered determined. Logically therefore is only one quest inn to be 
answered, what causes and conditions, what causal constellation, have 
brought about the phenomenon, the human conduct, what regularities 
have taken part in the formation of the conduct. Many put the question 
in a way. whet her the person in question could have shown a different, sav, 
tint criminal conduct. The reply is a simple one: yes, if other casual 
factors, other casual constellations had combined in forming his conduct. 
Since, however, no other factors, but exactly those in question and 
exactly these casual constellations have combined, the person could show 
no other conduct than the one he has shown. /. r. eag aw/crm/Lcd re/c/ar/ 
eoaA/ /aov rmar ia/o Aeiag oa/g ia a .siag/r av/g. aar/ oa/g ia /Ac av/g i/ /aas 
ream /a pa.s.s.
Determination on the phenomena being realized is less argued, 
although from this determination the law of dcterminacy of future 
phenomena may be derived straight. Past human conducts, too, along 
the line of time were positioned sometimes as potentialities, as probable 
relations. Therefore the laws relating to their determination, their causal 
determinedness, react also on the determination of future human conducts.
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The principle of determinism may be considered universal, beacuse it 
derives the determination of future phenomena front that of past ones.
Hence a reply to the question put before will be given by the analvsis 
of causality so far carried through and t he study of probable relations.
In connection with the freedom of choice the opinions of the profes­
sion arc divergent. There are some who insist on what is called consistent 
determinism. Among these in the first place mention should be made of 
Professor Korsi. who in his excellent work on legal liabilitv sets out from 
the material origin of consciousness amt from causa,! determinism and 
denies the freedom of choice. "The formation of consciousness is a cerebral 
function. Brain is of material character, and therefore it is subject to the 
most general laws of the motion. Consequently the operation of conscious­
ness is also subject to these general laws of motion. Motion of material 
character of the highest order lias specific regularities valid only for this 
sort of motion, neither even together with these it can lie an exception to 
t ie  operation of the laws, which are valid for every material motion. 
One of these regularities is determinedness: every material motion has a 
cause and an effect. The totality of the factors of the cause fully deter­
mine the effect. If it were not so, then there would remain motives with­
out a cause.
it is resulted in the fact that every human conduct is perfectly deter­
mined by its cause, i. e. the totality of factors eliciting this conduct, it. 
means that Амма/м сощ/мс/ i.s /о/м//у оме АидмосАммсс о/ м;мА-
<му оме .s' r-Aohc.' Tamas /MA/c.si is on the same opinion with the excep­
tion that in certain situations he recognizes the possibility of a person 
to make his choice, still he considers this choice determined as a whole l v 
external and internal determinants." The freedom of choice without any 
restrictiou is the doctrine .1умсд //c//cr has accepted: "The relative auto­
nomy of men is in its essence nothing but the relative freedom of choice. 
This means that man may make his choice of certain objectives:, acts, 
means, and so finally he may choose himself as a moral being. And he 
may make his choice not only choosing of several possibilities the one or 
the other (this would in any case still a manifestation of autonomy), but 
that he might have decided otherwise as he has decided. I. e. he may make 
Ins true and actual choice. * Similarly ftnre /fc/'cg is yet another follower 
ol the freedom of choice, i. e. of incomplete, "moderate" determinism.
In the university lecture notes on criminal law he says: "Determi­
nism is a part of Marxist—Leninist ideology, and that of the scientific 
conception of the Universe and of man." The position taken by the repre­
sentatives of natural sciences dealing with man, in the first place by 
geneticians and psychologists, and the notion of Marxist philosophers are. 
however, of different opinions as regards /Ac dcyrcc qf of
/Ac dcrc/opiMCM/ qf Аммтн регдоми/?'/?/.
The representatives of science agree that in a given situation the 
action is defined, in a way inevitable by the personality. This means that 
in a given situation a person cannot act contradicting his personality, i. e
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he "cannot he beside himself", and cannot act independent of himself, his 
intellect, his temperament, his feelings, his character.
In conformity with the rtdc.s of logic fromtheabove statement 
the conclusion can he drawn that life is nothing hut the process of succes­
sive situations, consequently the conduct of man is determined in each 
situation. So throughout his life man can never act in a wav other than 
he has actually acted. If the conduct of man is in every situation, in 
each moment of his life determined. /Ac '/crc/rpnafn/ <*</' /os prrxonn/i/// 
will necessarily he determined.
Against what has been set forth, inf"^ many brine forward the 
tenet that personality also has a self-determining role: it is capable of 
educating, developing itself. The self-determining role of personality is 
guaranted by the "will". Accordingly will under the guidance of the 
intellect ad// renr/ on personality, file intellect is capable of controlling 
the temperament, ¡tassions, feelings, discarding bad habits, developing 
the character, enlisting intellect for the sahe of proper aims. The signi­
ficance of the will guided by the intellect within a definite sphere, consists 
of the fact, that within the limits drawn by inherited qualities and the 
impact of society, it opens the gate to the self-control of human life in 
conformity with propriety, justification, the rules of social coexistence
and the moral vaiuesA
Abn/ryw/xer, the well-known Soviet criminologist, interprets the 
principle of determinism in a unique way. He asks the question whether 
the commission of a criminal offence ("output") is inevitably defined by 
its causes ("input"), or whether the random element has also a part to 
play in the process."
He answers the question as follows: Marxism absolutely recognizes 
the determinedness of all human actions, and at the same time it under­
lines their extreme complexity. Yet this determinism is not identical with 
the mechanical, unambiguous dependency of Laplace. The physiological, 
psychological and philosophical investigations of the present days supply 
an abundant stol e of facts for the clarification of the physical nature and 
character of causal relations dominant in nature and in society. A series 
of branches of science dealing with man and human activity in a fairly 
definite form stresses /Ae x/a/ix/icn/ r/now/cr o/ /Ae rc/a/max Ae/n-ee;; ruaxrx 
and wuni/'ex/tny /Ae;ax<"/rex in Aa/aaa coafAm/x, unm?u/ /Aen? in an/i-
xaria/ rondnr/x.
"The statistical approach docs by no means contradict determinism: 
it is a variant of it. Distinction should be made between dynamic and 
statisticalrelationsontheonepart. and regularities, on the other. Still 
the one as well as the other presupposes a causal interpretation and both 
are to their full extent embraced by determinism in the .Marxists meaning 
of the term."*"
Fssentiallv ALn/ryur/xfr identifies the causal relations, determine­
dness. with the regularities manifesting themselves in the phenomena and 
so beside determinedness he makes allowance for the random element. 
From this concept of determinedness he then derives the thesis of the
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]'e)¡tti\o indcjiendence of human ((inituct. Hrom this statement it stands 
out ctearty thal in human conduct ttie express, rigorous retationstiip tie-
tween causes amtcffcdsisattsent: " ---- this mcansthat eventhc negative
effects regutarty acting i'l man wit] not in at] circumstances provoke the 
viotation of the taw on tus part."" The position of Kudrvuvtscv has been 
criticised even in the Soviet Union. There are many who betieve that his 
doctrino has its origin "in the incorrect or at [east inaccurate" interpre­
tation of the diatectic rotation between nceessitv and random.'-
Severa! other authors tiotding simitar opinions may atso be quoted. 
Still the few ({notations witt in our opinion convey an idea of the typicat 
imptied in the different positions quoted here, tt is not intended here to 
arnuc witt) the incorrect or inaccurate theses in these (¡notations. What 
we intend to do is to set forth our position as tucid as possibte.
t tie ptnbtem of the freedom of choice, and of the determinedness of 
future human conduct shoutd tie approached by setting out from the 
(nnscious acti\it\ ot man. Human conduct is a purposeful conduct for 
the satisfaction of needs and retying on potcntiatilies. tt is the property 
of tinman consciousness in a moreor tess reatistic form to reftect objective 
reatitv. Within this the individual trains consciousness of his own exis­
tence, activity and sociat activity.
tn this connection András Ata/ió makes the appropriate statement 
that "The determinedness of human conduct before att means the detcr- 
minednoss of consciousness, and the determinedness of the conduct 
prevait through the effect that various conduct determining-factors 
exercise in consciousness.
! he (ielerniincdness of consciousness nt the suine time cmhruces tiie 
antieijiated image oi the possibte phenomena and their probabte conse­
quences. These take part in the form of aims and causes in the determina­
tion of the conduct. When the needs emerge in a person, and tic becomes 
conscious of them, the objects, rotations, means and etements of objective 
reatity witt turn up in consciousness, which are apt to satisfy the needs, 
together wit ti the manner in which these may be used of. There are sever- 
at ways, severa! means for the statisfaction of needs. These are, of course, 
not equivatent as regards either the degree of the satisfaction of the actuat 
needs, or the methods and the energy of the activity appropriated for the 
acquisition of the etements for the satisfaction of needs. They are not 
equi\atent even from the point of view of their social appreciation. There 
are sociatty approved and accepted ways ami means for the satisfaction 
of needs, atat there are yet others prohibited forms punishabte bv the taw 
or crimina! taw. Hence needs may be satisfied in a great variety of wavs. 
Society offers many potentialities to the individua!. E. g. after the compe­
tition oi the secondary sctioot otijectivety severa! opportunities can tie 
found as a reason for continuing some kinds of studies, or ttiose at uni­
versities for ttiose wtio want to graduate. There are fairty ampte setection 
of food, ctothes etc. avaitabte for the satisfaction of such needs. Naturattv 
cases may occur when in a given situation there is a narrow scatc of po- 
tentiatities only and a few atternatives wit! onty be given for the statis-
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factiot) of needs, or none at all. Therefore in this sense the variety of 
potentialities will he an objective reality only from the outside, on the 
part of society. In the words of Agnes Heller "This will not, however, 
he the manyfestation of autonomy by all means." It) fact this is true. 
Philosophers and specialists dealing with tire problem of the freedom of 
will do not in the first place argue this aspect of the freedom of choice, but 
the other aspect, namely whet Iter' tire individual may make his choice of 
objectively existing potentialities, whether we may say, and if we say 
so, we do say it correctly, that man may make his choice of these poten­
tialities, or whether all this is mere fiction, and thus the decision of human 
will to make the one choice or the other is determined, or more precisely, 
becomes determined.
It is an issue of facts that human conduct will realize one of the 
potentialities. Realization is, however, preceded by setting tire aim or 
target of the conduct, i. e. the acceptance of the one of tire potentialities 
in preference to the other ami the consideration of the method of carrying 
through the decision. This volition, or the pegging out of the purposeful 
action, is directly the rest)It of the struggle of subjective causes, i. o. of 
the motives, or motivation, or. in other words, determined by the motiv­
es. The needs, potentialities, means and methods of execution emerging 
in the consciousness of a definite person, i. e. becoming conscious in the 
form of motives, will be defined by the combined effect of the state of 
the person and the actual objective factors. The effect external objective 
rcalitv wdl have on the personality will depend on the person's, state and 
thus also on the directedness and attitude of the personality what the 
person will comprohand of this reality. The state of personality in turn is 
determined by objective factors of the past. Hence the motives which 
emerge in a person before he or she will be setting his or her aim or goal, 
are in like way predetermined. As can be seen the causal chain is at the 
same time a connotation of the process of determinedness. The deter­
minedness of some sort of a future human action already started in the 
past (in the present), and is going parallel to the lapse of time it will last 
until the realization of the phenomenon, i. e. until tin- phenomenon will 
become an effect. Thus within the sphere of human conducts determined- 
ncss prevails to the dull extent. There is no mystical force whatever 
which outside the causal chain would take part in the determination oi 
human conduct. Stilt if we want, or rather should like, to call the volition 
of the purposeful psychic activity of man accepting the one of the several 
potentialities and planning the realization of the acceptance a choice, 
there is no obstacle whatever to this: it is merely a matter of agreement. 
Still we have to be aware that this choice is as determined as any other 
social or natural phenomenon," and that it has nothing to do with the 
contents which indeterminism attributes to the notion of freedom of 
choice.
It) the dispute on the principles of determinism it often occurs that 
a wrong interpretation is given to it, wrong conclusions are drawn from it 
and so many on refuting the erroneous theses consider the principle of
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determinism refuted. According to Kudryavtsev e. g. the approval of 
mechanical determinism would lead in criminology to fatalism. "Truly, if 
certain causes would in all cases without exception trigger off the same 
consequences, then an individual brought up in a negative environment 
would infallibly turn criminal and it would be wasting time and exposing 
society to risks if we waited for the commission of an unlawful act."'*' 
Strictly speaking the author here takes arms against predestination, which 
by itself is the proper course. Vet predestination docs not follow from the 
thesis that wholly identical causes and conditions will in every case lead to 
identical conscfpiences. Here it should be remembered, however, in 
reality the environments of a person is criminogenous, he will be exposed 
also to positive influences and not only to negative impacts, I. e. the 
so-called criminogenous environment does not comprise all causes and 
conditions which might combine in the moulding of the personality of 
the man living in this environment, and so also in defining his actual 
conduct. Therefore not even from such and similar situations the perpet­
ration of a criminal offence will follow as of inevitable necessity. AH this 
means, however, is that not even the overwhelming part of the causal 
factors determine the phenomenon. Ttiis will be determined by the total­
ity of factors. I. e. the thesis that the totality of causes define the effect 
unambiguously will stand firmly. A criminogenous environment will 
not from the very outset determine the perpetration of the criminal 
offence: it w ill determine it normally, i. e. render the perpetration of the 
offence probable. Still the regular and random effect will in conjunction 
of nccessitv define human condui t, and so also criminal conduct.
3. Autonomy oi action
A cardinal problem of the interpretation of the determinist concept is 
that of the autonomy of action or the relative freedom of will.
Many are inclined to interpret the autonomy of action in a wav cal­
ling into doubt the complete determinedness of the human will. i. e. 
within certain objective limitations or potentialities man has freedom of 
decision. I. e. man may make his decision independently of the objective 
effects, even in a manner defeating them, he will be exposed to no influenc­
es whatever in makinn up his mind. M e shall not deal further with this 
obviously indeterminist point of view, as we have already defined out- 
attitude to it earlier.
There are, however, many who give a construction to the autonomy 
of action or to the relative freedom of will as if these notions meant the 
relative freedom of the personality or the individual in the face of the 
externa] factors taking part in determination.
The best known representative of this doctrine is Endre Farkas, who 
considers the recognition of the autonomy of action necessary in the 
general recognition of the principle of determinism.
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"Asfo r))m nan;)c t iv ityw eeannf)tcxp !o re t!)cpec))! ia rfo rm o fn)a)) i-
fostation of diatectic materialisnt untess within (¡to innnat) acts, through 
Hie analysis of the mutua! rotations of externa! and interna! forces. There­
fore when it comes to put t he question of what is caHed freedomof wi!!. it is 
not comp!cte determinedness, tntt t!)e autonotny of action expressing the 
re!ations of the externa! and interna! forces, the re!ative freedom of 
action. t)iat are the principa!.t!ie foca!prob!cm A ."Thcnafterafcw  
remarks on different ideas he continues: "As !)as been shown ear!ier, 
itutnati action wi!! come into !)eit)g on the ground of the mutua! determi- 
nedness of the externa! and the interna! forces. And if these dialectics 
are studied from the aspect of the interna! forces, the statement mav he 
made that the externa! forces do not define the action unequivocal! v. 
moreover, without the interna! forces the process of events, the ..circuit" 
would not even close, ft is exact!y this where the re!ativc independence of 
personality of the externa! environment finds expression, //rare /Ac 
'Odmmaq/ of ur/nm qf e.w7/y e.rpre.s-,"es /An/ of /Ac /orce.s- operu/iwy oa 
Aa-MM/w. u/ /Ac ytt-fH /i/Me ao/ o a f /  /Ac g.r/grnu/. Aa/ n/.so /Ag ia /e raa /
/orccx a;7/ dgfiac /Aix r/r/imo uad for /An/ aat//er /Ac ia/eraaV/ar/orA fas 
ia/craa/ raa.se a ad as ia/eraa/ ar/ioaf an'// a/.so ar/ aa ia?pn/7aa/ par/ ia 
Ariayi;ty a&aa/ /A¿.s ar/ioa.""'
As for its contents one may agree to the ideas here formulated to 
their full extent. An autonomy of action or freedom of action which 
emphasizes the retative independence of personafity as compared to the 
actua! objective impacts does not contradict the princip!e of determinism. 
The estabhshment of the autonomy of action within determinedness 
wi!! appear as who!!y natura! for science. Sti!! it wi!! have an enormous 
significance for man brought up in the atmospehere of indeterminism 
and sti!! professing it. inasmuch as it advances the understanding and 
recognition of the principte of determinism. Therefore the stress !aid on 
the retative independence of personality against the effects of externa! 
factors, i. e. the tenet that these factors do not mechanicaHy eHicit from 
man a reaction, has its raison d'etre, because it makes it c!ear that the 
materialist ideo!ogv does not identify determinedness prevaiting in 
human conducts wit!) theprinciptcof mechaniea! determinedness. In the 
scheme of eausatity this wi!! be given expression it) a way that the objec­
tive factors defining actua! persomditv have been appraised as separate 
relations, as objective factors of the past, and that the anticipated image 
of future conduct has been recognized as the cause at the end of the 
actiond" As it has already been mentioned personakty, as it is, se!ects the 
external effects, transforms then), adapts thou to the directedness and 
menta] disposition of the individual. Sti!! how personality selects, how it 
receives the externa! effects, is at this moment a!ready determined. 1. e. 
the autonomy of action is a!so determined or is on the wav of becoming 
determined. It is exactiy for this reason that the reiative autonomy of 
actua! personality compared to its externa! objective work! must not be 
identified wit!) the concept of the freedom of wi!!. Relative freedom of 
wi!! means that the determination of will cannot be traced back comp!ete!y
1K2 P R O F . DR. J O Z S E F  v tG H
to the causes eliciting this will, in the last resort to material causes, and 
that in a manner independent of these "something" is manipulating "'¡th­
in the limits of objective potentialities.
Still even notionally the terminology of the relative freedom of 
will is wrong, beacause ;7 i# M o/ /Ac a;7/ /An/ Ao.s re/ot;re iadcpcadeacc ia. 
rc.spcr/ o/ /Ac ar/aa/ uAg-r/bY' fsnrio/. /a'o/oyb'o/7 c//crtA', Aa/, Ac/orc /Ae deci- 
.sioa g/i/d /. /Ac octao/ pcr.soao/d//. Or in other words, the decision of will, is 
not the adequate reflection of the quality and strength of the actual 
objective effects, it is rather these effects which manifest themselves in 
the decision of will (volition), and in the presence of suitable conditions, 
in the conduct, even culpable conduct, in accordance with the state of 
personality.
It is worth while to mention in this connection that thé relative 
autonomy of actual personality cannot be discovered in everv man to a 
uniform extent. In children necessarily this autonomy will manifest itself 
to a lesser degree than in adults, and in the same way there will be diffe­
rences also in the autonomy of the actual personality of primitive men 
of low standards of intelligence in comparison to highly civilized man 
possessing an abundance of experiences and well apuainted with the regu­
larities of life.
1. Self-determination
Closely associated with the autonomy of action there is the problem 
of self-determination. Doctrines in the self-determination of conduct have 
been advanced in for practical purposes all fields of professional literature 
in philosophical, psychological and legal writings equally. In Hungary 
the idea of self-determination of the subject manifests itself before all in 
the influence exercised by Rubinstein, the well-known Soviet psycholo­
gist. Almost without exception all writers on the subject quote him as an 
authority.
/CdnaA'Ca'a explains the self-determining role of the subject in the 
following words: "W e cannot explain the origin of human will merely by 
the transformation of internal processes from the outside, as has been 
done by traditional, functional psychology. The origin of the will presup­
poses the change in the mutual relations of the individual and his envi­
ronment, the outside world, a change which generate internal transforma­
tion, too. The starting-point of the origin of the will is formed by the 
appetites (further the affective components of the appetites are the 
elementary experiences in which we perceive something as desirable, 
attractive or repulsive). However, as long as the acts of the individual 
are in the power of appetites, as long as these acts are determined directly 
by the organizational or natural peculiarities, the individuum will in 
the specific meaning of the term have no will.
Strictly speaking a will arises at the moment when man is cap­
able of subjecting his desire to reflection, iw order Pi rcAde to 
7Ae;a in one way or other. To this and the individual will have to prevail
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over his desires and in a manner abstracted from them lie wiii have to 
awake himseif to the consciousness of ins Ego as the stdijeet, who mav 
have desires of the one kind or the other, yet he wii! not become dis- 
soived sejiarateiy in each one of his appetites or in the totaiitv of his 
desires, hut wiil rise above them and wi!l be capabie of seiecting his 
desires. As the resuit oi this process ins acts wiii not be determined 
dircctiv !)y his desires as forces of nature, but by himseif. Hence the 
origin of tile wiii. as part or component, is inseparahiy attached to the 
birth of tiie individuai as subject, wtio defines his con­
duct himseif, freeiy ami u/7u7ruri//y, ami wiii answer to it. v!au become 
such a subject possessing consciousness and capabie of seif-determination 
throufgh tiie ideation of his reiations to the other man objectivixed in the 
iegai and moral norms."'* The words of Rubinstein arc not in agreement 
with tiie phrascoiogy of determinism. Nor does hiswhoieicarre refiect a 
uniformity of his attitude to tiie probiem. i'ndoubtcdiy his sentences or 
statements overwiieimingiy give expression to tiie principie of determi­
nism. By tiie side of such statements, however, perhaps for fear of an 
charge for pro-determinism, there arc points of view simitar to those 
fpioted before in his works. Fbidcsi. e. g. pronounces a sharp criticism 
on account of the misunderstundabie theses of Rubinstein on tiie deter- 
mineducss of the wiii.'"
For want of a ciear-ciit, unambiguous formuiation the position Ru­
binstein has taken iias ie<! to confiicting standpoints atso in tiie work of 
his foiiowers.
To confirm tins statement iet us quote a passage from tiie work of 
Farkas. Speaking of tiie roie of tiie causes at the end of the action iie 
aptiv remarks ti n "in this process there is nowhere, cither un t lie struggie 
of tiie motives, or in tiie formation of tiie consciousness of purpose, or in 
the nientai void ion. an ¡aiding of mystic indeterminacy: there is no seif­
exciting free wiii. on the contrary, throughout consistent determinism 
prevaiis."
"This complot" determined less docs not. however, mean fataiist 
predestination, in tin- iife of man everything is determined, but nothing is 
predetermined. As a matter of fact tiie determiuacy of human action aiso 
presupposes the self-determination of the subject. As has been seen, this 
scifdctermination takes piacc in two forms: through the activity of 
the intrinsic causes and of tiie intrinsic conditions."-''
The reference to an eariier passage in tiie form of "as has been seen", 
provided that the previous exposition of the author has been understood 
as meant by him. is directed to the intertwining of tiie psychic happenings 
between tiie prompting to action and tile act carried through, ami to tile 
motivation manifesting itseif in the meanwhiic, "tiie intrinsic forces act 
as action determining factors."-'
To tend a higher degree of aut henticity to his statements the author 
quotes Rubinstein: '"t his seif-determination of the subject is a necessary 
iiuk in tiie determinedness of action. As king as it docs not take piace, not 
aii conditions determining action wiii be present, i. e. action wiii not even
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lie determined lie fore all these are existent. If we presumed that action 
had been determined before and thus eliminated the freedom of man. we 
should substitute predestination for determinism."-- On this ground 
f arkas then draws his conclusions: "By way of summing the answer to 
the first set of problems of free will, to the question of determinaev or 
indcterminacy we may state that as in all other phenomena of the mate­
rial world, there are no mystical, indeterminate phenomena. Human 
action (or in the traditional terminology: human will) is by the totality of 
the external and internal forces to the full extent determined and self- 
determined in the process of becoming determiner!: this we may express 
with the simplified formula A' A* .1. (here A' denotes the external con­
ditions ami circumstances. A? stands for the internal causes ami .4 for the 
will (action). This doctrine rejects the doctrine of indeterminism relating 
to the free will, and the teaching of fatalism on prdestination, anti substi­
tutes complete determinism also embracing the self-determination of 
man for the mystic sslf-exciting free will and fatalism."*'
It cannot be argued that f arkas is the follower of determinism, still 
his exposition on self-determination is not quite clear, ft is easily misun­
derstood, the difference between, "mystic self-excitation" and "self- 
determination" is not well perceptible, and therefore it appears as if man 
stood above the process of determination, as if he would be the guidcr of 
the process rather than a participant. This theoretical formulation of 
purposeful human activity has led certain experts of criminology to give 
expression to the in general recognised concept of determinism in a man­
ner easily misunderstood. Föfvári e. g. enumerates among the theses 
relating to the determinedness of t he will also the one that "the individual 
may influence the development and formation of his personality.'"-' 1. e. 
the individual stands above his personality. Then later, from the point 
of view of responsibility she defines the basic problem by asking the 
question "/o a/ad c.r/ca/ c/nr# /Ac c/'/Ar pf;wn'iM.y depend on /Ac
inddddn'd? Do external circumstances by themselves decide the forma­
tion of personality, or do the congenital, inherited faculties of man direct 
thisor perhaps the two in combination, or may perhapsa person possessing 
an intellect, the faculty of valuation and choice determine the develop­
ment of his personality notwithstanding the influence of external cir­
cumstances and inherited faculties/"-''
In connection with the opinions of Földvári !\1. Ficsór aptly remarks 
that "The essence of man is lent bv his personality; the mention of the 
individual as something outside personality, and capable of influencing 
this personality. . . . may conceal the clandestine duplication of man."*' 
Here the question may justly be asked that if "the person possessing 
an intellect, the faculty of valuation and choice" is above his personality, 
what are the notions which may describe this personality. Eventuallv 
Földvári, by referring to Rubinstein, comes to the conclusion that "either 
we recognize the power of man to shape his character or personality, and 
in this case we have to recognize the possibility also that man may come 
to a multiplicity of decisions, or we deny the possibility of self-education
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an(!t)ics!iapiiigof})ersonah<ya)i<!int!hscaseiveconsi(!crt!ic<!ecision 
of wiü unamt'iguous and ])rcf!ctei'mincí!. . ." Wcrccognixc t!ic comptctc 
<!eterm ine(!nessoft!iewi!!!)y materia! factors. stiütogetiicrw itii H. 
F:ukas we recognixe ttie possüiüity a!so of tuaking t!ic clioicc of a uundicr 
ofactions.
T!te wH) of man is detennined by externa! as wcü as interna! factors 
coni))!ete!y, stiü títere is ahvays ieft a ehanee for a nndtipheity of actions. 
TodcnythiswouManiounttofataüsn). \v!iiehisthc])ro})ertyofnice!tanis- 
tie. vet notdia!ecticmatcria!ism."-'
In onr opinion ttiere is a cotaiti contraiiictioti iti t líese statonents. 
!f externa! and interna! faetors com!ete!y <!efine t!ie wiü, t)ien man 
eoiddbetiave in a uniforniwayonly in t)ie sanie situation. ()!)\ious!y in a 
eotierete act t!ie causa! faetms do not make aüowance for a different aet. 
Tiie leferenee to t!ie positimi taken tiv Farkas deniotistrates t!iat owing 
tothefornndationdifficidt togras]) Mr. Fb!<!và)imisinterprete(!t!ie 
essence of t!<e autononiv of action or se!f-determination as defined bv 
Parkas.
in our ojiinion t!ie "setf-detennining function oftlie srdtject" isapt 
on!y to introiiuce difficidties into ttie understanding of t!ie principie of 
determinism. Here t!ie gist of the ])ro!)!em is, !iow tiunian conduct. t!ie 
acts of tnati. are determinedf The wiü or the détermination of the decision 
of wit! is though the cardiîia! phase in the process of détermination, stiü 
personahty deterniines t!ie action, the deed. on)y in conjonction with the 
externa) conditions. And neither are t)ie (iecision of wiü. ttie ititention. 
iiientica! with the deeii: tiotti ici!) devetop to it oti!y in the presence of 
appropriate conditions.
Xobody déniés that t)ie personahty of man. the actúa! personahty. 
dispose of no relative independence in the face ofthe externa! environi- 
ent or the intrinsic needs. !t isexact!y the essence ofpurposefidactivity 
tliat the actúa! personahty in a manner corresponding to its directedness 
or attitude füters t!ie externa! stimuh, makes its ctioice t!ie means of the 
satisfaction of needs according to ttieir (!egree and serpience of manifesta­
tion. As the residt of this psvchic process (tecision of wiü be boni for 
the transiatioti into reahty of the one of the possibihties. and in a manner 
appearing to be t!ie most ajtpropriate and most reasonatde for the statis- 
faction of t!ie needs of man or the individua!. Stiü [ogicaüy this psychic 
process cannot !ie taken for se!f-dctermination. because tiere ttie cpiestion 
is one of the création of the decision of wiü hy the combined effect of 
externa! and interna! objective rekitions. and not one of man standing 
in the midst of the process of détermination determining himsetf. or even 
of the personahty determining itseff.
Naturaüv ttie question w!iet!ier man may edúcate himsetf. from his 
personahty, may justfy be put. !t was Marx w)iodec!arcd that man i)i the 
course of his activité not on!y transfoimis, [mtnanixes ttie externa! wor!<!, 
but at the same time changes himself.-^
\V!iat is undertving t)iis ctiange is the interaction of man and the 
externa! worhi. The nature and society shaping acts of man not on!y pro-
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(Luce external changes, but also react on tlie acting niaa himself. it is in 
this sense that A. Szabo speaks of the self-determining eionents of per­
sonality. "Alarxist sociology recognizing tliat man is aiso a link in tiie 
causa! ciiain determining social reality at the same time emphasizes that 
human action is fully determined and this also includes the self-determin­
ing element of personality. W ithout the recognition of the self-deter­
mining element of personality we should deny the capacity of man to 
translate potentialities into reality, we should deny his role in the prepara­
tion of happening."-"
On speaking of causality we have made it clear that the acts of 
man's own have a parlicuratly significant effect on man. for he is with 
these in the most direct connection. It the acts of man are adequate for 
the satisfaction of man's needs in accordance with his ideas, or even 
beyond them, then they will encourage him to similar acts and vice 
versa.
It is exactly owing to his conscious or self-conscious nature that man 
can recognize the regularities which in the long run guarantee the satis­
faction of his needs, i. e. these regularities will be reflected in man him­
self. Consequently he will consciously carry through acts (e. g. the winning 
of a university diploma) which will render him capable of pursuing activ­
ities of which he was incapable earlier. Or he may become aware of the 
regularity that knowledge stands for the better understanding of social 
conditions, a fact which is useful also for the individual and which also 
serves his interests, so. that he will embark on activities for the ac­
quisition of a variety of disciplines. A// //us Ac roMsidercd scy/euc/ung, 
sc//-<?dacu/ioM, //;e coascimis /oram/ioa o/ one's on a persona/;/;/. All this, 
however, does not defeat the principle of determinism a title, for the 
decision of will directed to this activity and the pursuit of the activity 
itself becomes reality through the process of determination in the same 
way as any other phenomenon.
The reality of purposeful activity performed for the acquisition of the 
ability for self-education and adaptation, and for the better satisfaction 
of needs is denied not even by the followers of determinism: on the contra­
ry, the attribute a high degree of significance to this activity.""
In this connection Tokaji aptly states: "Since the so-called self-move­
ment of personality is in our opinion determined (at least by the foregoing 
development of personality), we belive that neither the rederence to the 
"self-movement" of the consciously acting man can be smuggled back into 
some sort of a minimum freedom of will disintegrating the "closed system" 
of the determinants.
Hence "self-determinism " cannot be accepted for its contents unless 
we understand by it the retroaction of the activity of the individual on 
the formation of personality, as objective reality and the role of this 
activity of a determinant in the process of determination.
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5. The illusion of (he freedom of choice
From all that lias been set forth so far it has become obvious that 
determination prevails it) the decision of will in the same way as in the 
birth of any other phenomenon, and consequently there is no free will 
existing independently of the material conditions. There is a fact verv 
often contrasted with this viewpoint according to which man feels like 
deciding freely and being able to choose any of the possibilities. Dctermi- 
nist doctrine considers the experience of a free choice merely a fiction, 
an erroneous reflection of reality. Inconcctionwith this Gy. Xyird. the 
well-known psychiatrist, writes as follows: "The idealist philosophers, the 
indeterminists in "will" presuppose a special human faculty of a spiritual 
character independent of matter. According to this doctrine man decides 
freely how tat act. They try to demonstrate the truth of their allegation 
with the teaching of religion and the subjective experience according to 
which if we act the feeling as if we did so freely and that we could also 
have done the opposite arises in us. Materialist medical science cannot adopt 
this doctrine.aud regards the will no events as free, as an independent, 
spiritual event, so to say emerging from the total of the soul. We do not- 
feel the determined nature of our decision, because oar no'// As* //tc /jotr/tott 
o/' Me process o/ oryouf^o/tou q/' rr/eran/ btf/acacc.s on<7 bderao/ Anp/tea- 
iay.s.
" 7 7 u -  .saA/cVd-c c.rpcrieacc Mnf "v- wMc dcrós;nn.s./'re<7y As- oa t/M.sioa. 
.se/y-dcccp^oa. // /"7,s d.s ort'ytac /a Me /MV MM atou )a /Ac /aas.sc.s.s/oa o/' Me 
.secoat/ .st'yaa/iciay .sy.s/c/a r/óspo.sc.s o/ a wacA /nryrr aaatAcr o/ coaacc/tay 
po&'A'iAt7i/t'c.s. a.s na// oMcr <b'rtay Actay. ,1/aa rc/7cc/.s Me tcorA/ ca a <Van/;'/y.' 
ao/ oa/y /a AAs pcrccp/ioa.s Aa/ aAso ¿a AM awtAs. Since man is capable of 
translating tlte contents of the first signalizing svstem into another sig­
nalizing system, viz. the world of words, and since the words itt their bio­
logical effects, if only itt a rudimentary form, essentially represent the 
stimulus which they purport to refer to in their name, it appears to be 
confirmed that the "process of volition" is not even the psychological 
projection of some sort of a psychological event, but only its consequence, 
which, dependent ott conditions, has come to pass. The animal is capable 
only of simultaneous connections, only a previous after image or engratn 
simitar to the stimulus will turn up in its consciousness and direct its 
motional conduct. Man. in possession of the second signalizing system, 
disposes of successive connecting facilities, and in response of an external 
stimulus, masses of images revive in him, the traces of all the amount of 
knowledge have been piled up in him and converted into dynamic stereo­
types, all which (Luting the cognition of the world, through learning, the 
influence of fashion, through the different influences of society, social 
tradition, owing to relationships."S'*
A similar position has been taken by Hleuler, a German psychiatrist. 
In his doctrine in the Ego psychic experiences, or complexes, lead to a 
result which owing to identism we experience as our own will. Hence 
endeavours, appetites, aims can reach ideation only as endeavours, etc.
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of our own. The force of vohtion derives from the teve) of instincts, affects; 
and this tevcl is in the wake of ancient experiences just as we!) and caus- 
a!)v established as any ottier biotogical experience. Jt is a pecuiiar 
(teiusion ttierefore, wticn man has the fecting as if tie coutd tiave acted 
ottierwise. This coutd tie possihte onty if ttie motives or congenital instincts 
and inctinations coutd tie ottier oncs.-^
lfetusions simitar to those of ttie freedom of witt may tie encountered 
atso in other fietds of everyday tile. E. g. ttie slant ing appearence of a 
straight object immersed in water owing to refaction, or the mutuat 
rotation of the dimensions of objects nearer to us and in the distance 
owing to the distance, or the rotation of the sun round tiie earth, are alt 
phenomena where observation departs from reality. We merety know of 
reality we may imagine it. stilt as sensation or experience the distorted 
reflection wit) remain. Ami owing to a distorted, freakish reftection man. 
with an erroneous outtook to tilings, witt consider the unreal reaiitv until 
knowledge, experience witt direct his attention to the processes of objectiv 
reality.
Actualtv tinman knowtedge has advanced beyond the boundaries 
of direct perception. By indirect methods, or deductions regutarilies and 
laws may tie recognized whose existence can tie proved beyond doubt. 
Here ontv the fopertiican discoveries, or the welt-known periodic system 
of Mendcteev should tic remembered, where deductive statements have 
ted to the recognition and observation of certain missing elements.
According to the psychiatrists or ncurophysiotogists medicat science, 
and tiiotogy have provided undefcatahte proofs of the causal determina­
tion of tinman conduct. It is an estabtished fact that consciousness is a 
product of the brain. Moreoverthc regionsofthe brain are known whorethc 
particutar etements of the facutty of speech, viz. facititv of writing, of 
reading, articukited speech and the facutty of understanding speech 
may tie tocatized." What tiiotogy or medicat science is stitt unabte to 
demonstrate without ambiguity is not determination of ttie witt. but the 
accurate neuro —phisiotogica) process of determination. Perhaps owing 
to an imperfect knowtedge of ttie phvsiotogicat mechanism in particutar 
among ttie representatives of ttie social sciences there are stitt many who 
do not consider ttie determination of tinman conduct sufficientty proved. 
From this point of view in particutar the outtook of Bckés may tie termed 
as tvpicat: "Ttie question is, whether........ /Ae posif ion. taken by mechanic­
al determinism, or that of moderate determinism is ttie corret one, cannot 
be decided at this moment, because neither position can be proved scienti­
fically. Both statements are so far merety thcoreticat thesises," (In his 
lecture notes on the general part of Criminat Law.)''-*
Even the way tie puts the question is inaccurate: ttie question here is 
not whether mechanical determinism or moderate determinism is ttie 
correct one. tint first whether determination prevaits in human conduct 
and so in cutpabtc human conduct too. secondly, if this is the case, how, 
in what form, and means of what mechanism determination operates. 
Ttie first question was answered by science positively a tong time ago, the
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second witt t<e given witli the progress of science with ever improving 
precision in the future.
Titc history of ¡(teas, and aisf) of the different trends of ideas. c!e;niv 
demonstr.atc tttat ideas owe titeir origin to (tefinite causes aiut conditiotts 
and that with the change of circumstances they tun e yietded to more mo­
dern or more exact trends. The idea of indeterminism is also closed* asso­
ciated with a certain tevet of cognition or science. Technical, biotogicat 
and sociat sciences have atready proved tied there exists causatity as the 
rotation between cause and effect, in each form of the phenomena. The 
domination of determination in tins sphere atso fottows front the causa! 
rotations of human conducts. This outtook may today be considered the
genera): indeterminism has but few champions. For a scientific mind it 
woutd he hard to adopt the point of view of indeterminism mcrclv bc-
cause tlie physiotogicat vw-ws ot the processes determining human wilt arc 
not yet known in details. fhisapptiesatso to "moderate determinism 
which is but indeterminism with certain [imitations. The fact that the 
principtc of determinism is not in agreement with a number oftheorcticat 
theses renting to human conduct (e.g .retahation  as the purpose of 
lmnistunent) ittust not tead to ttie rejection of determinism: on the cont­
rary the thesiscs conceived on the ground ot eartier determinism have 
to tie adapted to modern determinism.
ft is fundamentatty erroneous to assume that the principte of deter­
minism prevaits in phenomena of nature, e. g. in mechanics in tlie same 
way as in those of sociat sciences, e. g. in delinquency. The wav the prin­
cipte of determinism dominates wit) in alt cases bear the marks of tlie 
specific nature ot the phenomenon. Mcchanicat determinism is not erro­
neous by itself: it is the tendency that is wrong, notaidv a tendenev which 
wants to transptant the determination manifesting itsetf in the move­
ments of mechanics, of sotid bodies into the dom nion of human conduct . 
Human conduct is a form of motion of different kind, thus not ontv the 
pattern of determination wit) tie different but certain regutierities a s  
wc)h Here the specific nature is given by tlie personality of man. his con­
sciousness, his purposefut action. Many oppose the approval of the concept 
of determinism because in their opinion determinism goes together with 
the rejection of the concept of freedom. These two concepts are. however, 
not preclusive of cacti other, on the contrary: the one presupposes the 
other. It was Faigets who has already ctearty formukdedthe contents 
freedom, when tie wrote that freedom did not consist in an imaginarv 
independence of the taws of nature, but in the recognition of these taws 
and in the potentiahties offered by them to entist the taws of nature ba­
the service of aims defined according to ptan. This can tie apptied in tile 
same way to the taws which brought under regutation the corporeat and 
intetlectuat existence of man. to the two categories of taws which coutd 
be segregated from one another at most in the mind, hut never in reatitv. 
Therefore ttie freedom of wit) merety meant the faculty of making deci­
sions with understanding. Hence freedom was dominion over oursetves 
and externat nature based on ttie cognition of natural exigencies.^' We
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tan speak of the freedom of wiil oniy when the decision of will conforms 
to tiie reguiarities manifesting tiiemseives in t)ie [liienomena. or there is 
congrnity iietween them. On the other hand any decision ignoring the 
dominant taws must lie termed as arbitrary. (For the details of ttie concept 
of freedom the work of H. Farkas (¡noted above.)
A. Szabó transplants the ¡(teas of F nee is into the sphere of legal retal­
iation and crimina! iiuman comiuct witli extreme clarity and in agra]<iiic
form: ".......... for tiie subject the iegai provision is as much a iaw as the
externa] (objective) iaw. as tiie iaw of nature or tiie sociai iaws. As a 
matter of fact tiie provision of iaw. as norm ami as requirement, is ¡tart 
ami parce) of reality: it docs not ffoat over reality, it cannot be confronted 
to reality (here we have in mind tiie erroneous setting of tiie question of 
"S'cia" and "Ro/Zca" (in tiie first piacé.)"/" Tiie provisions of iaw are for 
tiie persona! wit! andtiie subject asobjective iawsastheiaws of production 
relations or tiie iaws of nature.)"/'* if  tiie conduct faiis to conform to tiie 
demands expressed in tiie iegai norms, ifit  faiis to enforce tiie iegai obii- 
gation, is it possibie to speak of tiie freedom of wili at aii ? Obiy such a 
person can act freeiy, who acts in sociaiiv proper manner (tiie contents 
of his witl and iiis conduct conform to objective externa) iaw). anv other 
action is arbitrary ami only tiie semblance of freedom ('*'") for tiie crimi- 
nai offence is a voiitionai action: tiie realization of tiie anticipated aims 
of tiie criminal. We have seen, however, that voiitionai action cannot 
stand for the higher form of an act of tiie wili uniess in its contents it 
conforms to tiie objective requirements.'"7
As wit! be seen, tiie freedom of wiil, this interpretation of freedom, 
can tie reconciied in every respect to tiie interest attached to tiie reduction 
of dciinqucncy and the properly interpreted sociaiist iiabiiity under 
crimina! iaw.
6. Tiie "diaiectie" interpretation of determination
Die iast remark associated with the principle of determinism relate 
to "dialectic" interpretation. It may occur, in particular in phiiosophica- 
iiterature, that in genera! for tiie "rcsoiution" of tiie inconsistent forum)- 
ation or standpoint of tiie author, yet in reaiity for tiie unveiiing of contra­
dictions, such and simiiar formuiations are represented as diaiecticai. 
T. Foidesi in his dispute with A. fly. Szabó in a iiriiliant manner demon 
strates that a phenomenon cannot he determined and not determined at 
tiie same time. In his opinion aii that argumentation of this type has to do 
with diaiectics is what tiie statement wouid iiavc to do, that "for its 
essence tiie worid is matériái — for its essence the worid is spiritual."""
A simiiar formuiatiou can be found in the writing of Judith Fodor, 
stiii here only the formuiatiou may be made subject to criticism, as tier 
point of view is an unmistakabiy determinist one. On analysing tiie pro­
blem ofsingle-muiti-meaning and of the multi-singie-meaning determi­
nedness she comes to tiie conclusion that "With a phrase by far not alien 
to diaiectics the contradiction can be resolved in the way that we prove*
IN T E R P R E T A T IO N  O F  D E T E R M IN A T IO N  IN  D E L IQ U E N T  H U M A N  C O N D U C T  ]!)]
" /Aiay C7R cmac ia/o Ac;7;y o///// i</ /Ac M*u// ;7 Au.s co//U' 7/Aoa/. uad  u/ /Ac wo;.c 
/;7ac ;7 coa/d Acre соа;с ia/o Ac icy in a/; ^/Acr cc//.' i/ As dc/crcu'ccd амс/ car/c- 
/crc/i/u 'd <7/ /Ac woac /ia^c <7; .so,/hr res ic /Ac coar.se q/' i/.s /o r/au /ioa  i/ ///res 
/ r O R i  / O / d c / C / R U R c d  /o d c / c r R U R C / / . " ' ^
In tins sentence the terms "at the same time" and "at the time" seem 
to convey the idea of contemporaneity, in this ease the statement cannot 
be true: the remark of Foldcsi wiii be vaiid for it. Still if this is the case 
of separate time, to what wo may conciudc faintiy from the last clause of 
the sentence, then instead of the "dialectic" explanation creator ciaritv 
of tiie formuiation woutd have suited better scientific requirements. This 
outiook has encouraged the present author to demonstrate t)a- uutenabie 
character of a "too-too" standpoint by reference to a concrete phenomen­
on. There are houses already built up, others being built, and yet others 
to be built in the future. .May we say on the analogy of [-'odor's definition 
that a house is built ami has not been built yet at the same time? Or mav 
a house once built up could at the same time have been built up otherwise ? 
Obviously only half of the statement is true. In the first sentence the 
house has cither been built up. or not been built up. Here a decision 
docs not require a particular theoretical erudition. In the second sentence 
only the statement is true that it could have been built up only as it 
has been built up. because if it had been built up otherwise, it would not be 
the same house. Xaturally houses may be built and are even bein<f built 
in a variety of ways, still a concrete house could be built up only in the 
way it has been built up. And any house to be built, in the future can be 
luult up in a single way only, in the way as defined by the design and its 
execution. Stilt this is as simple also as far as human conductsare concern­
ed. A concrete future act. any concrete act, i. e. any human conduct 
can pass off in a single way only, in the way namely as determined by the 
subjective and objective factors. XaturaHy the meaning of the words 
will be different according to whether we speak of houses, or human con­
ducts, or phenomena. In this sense there are determined phenomena 
(built up houses, realised human conducts), and there may be and even 
will be phenomena in the process of being determined (not yet determin­
ed), sieh as houses in the process of being built or to be built in the 
future, criminal offences in the process of perpetration orto be perpetrat­
ed. etc. These thoughts cannot, however, be contracted into a shade 
sentence in a way that phenomena are determined and not determined, 
in the same way as it would be meaningless to state of houses that they 
have been, and have not been luult up.
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ie r  o b je k t iv e , v o n  d e n  m a te r ie l le n  V e rh ä ltn is s e n  u n a b h ä n g ig e  W ille  k e in e n  P la tz  h a t ,  d a s  
V e rb re c h e n  is t ,  b e z ie h u n g sw e ise  w ird  a lso  .h u c h  fiit. U rsa c h e n  u n d  B e d in g u n g e n  e in d e u t ig
D a s  M ilieu  b ie te t  m e h re re  M ö g lich k e iten  z u r  B e d ü rfn isb e f r ie d ig u n g  a u c h  fü r  d ie  
m e n sc h lic h e n  T ä t ig k e it ,  a b e r  w elch e  M ö g lic h k e it v o m  M en sch en  r e a lis ie r t  „ g e w ä h lt"  w ird , 
is t  d ie  F o lg e  d e r  U rsa c h e n , d e r  B e d in g u n g e n , d . h . d ie  D e te rm in a t io n  k o m m t a u c h  hei d e r  
E n ts c h e id u n g  z u r  G e ltu n g .
D ie  K o n z e p tio n  d e s  „ v e r h ä l tn is m ä ß ig  f re ien  W ille n s"  is t in so fe rn  a n z u e rk e tm e n , d a ß  
d ie  a k tu e l le  P e r sö n lic h k e it  d e n  o b je k t iv e n  (ä u ß e re n  u n d  in n e re n )  W irk u n g e n  g e g e n ü b e r , 
in fo lg e  d e s  B e w u ß tse in s , e in e  v e rh ä l tn is m ä ß ig e  S e lb s tä n d ig k e i t  h a t .  D iese v e r h ä l tn is ­
m ä ß ig e  S e lb s tä n d ig k e i t  is t  a b e r  d u rc h  d ie  o b je k t iv e n  W irk u n g e n  d e r  V e rg a n g e n h e it  d e t e r ­
m in ie r t .  D a  is t  a b e r  a u c h  n ic h t  v o n . W illen , so n d e rn  v o n  d e r  S e lb s tä n d ig k e it  d e r  a k tu e l le n  
P e r sö n lic h k e it  d ie  B ede.
D ie S tu d ie  B e to n t ,  d a ß  d ie  D e te rm in a t io n  im  K re ise  d e s  m e n sc h lic h e n  V e rh a l te n s  
g a n z  a n d e r s  z u r  G e ltu n g  k o m m t, w ie be i d en  m e c h a n is c h e n  o d e r  im  a llg e m e in e n  bei d e n  
E rsc h e in u n g e n  d e r  X a tu r .  B ei d e r  E n ts te h u n g  d e r  S t r a f t a t ,  a ls  W irk u n g  sp ie le n  d ie  Z iel- 
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ПОНЯТИЕ ДЕТЕРМИНАЦИИ В ВИНОВНОМ ПОВЕДЕНИИ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
Проф. Д-р. ЙОЖЕФ ВИГ 
доцент
(Резюме)
В литературе уголовного права социалистических стран все больше научных 
работ занимается отношением между детерминацией в виновном поведении чело­
века и ответственностью но уголовному нраву. В научной работе детерминация 
оформляется как общепринятой закон, который осуществляется одинако н в явле­
ниях прошлого и в явлениях будущего. Из этого положения вытекает, что в винов­
ном поведении человека нс имеет места объективная, не зависимая от материальных 
отношений воля, т. е. преступление однозначно определяется или определено при­
чинами и УСЛОВИЯМИ.
Окружающая среда дает много возможностей для удовлетворения потреб­
ностей и для человеческой деятельности, но то, что из этих которую выбирает, 
,,реализирует" человек, совершитель преступления, является последствием причин 
и условий, т. е. и в решении осуществляется детерминация.
Концепция ,,относительно свободной воли" признается в том смысле, что 
данное лицо вследствие сознания имеет относительную самостоятельность в отно­
шении объективных (внешних и внутренних) действий. Эта относительная само­
стоятельность однако определена объективными влияниями прошлого. Но и здесь 
речь идет о самостоятельности данного человека и не о самостоятельности воли.
Научная работа подчеркивает, что детерминация иначе осуществляется в 
кругу виновных поведений человека, чем н кругу механических или вообще естест­
венных явлений. В возникновении преступления, как следствия, илграют большую 
роль цели, мотивы, представления целей, антиципирующие возможности будущего. 
Это является наиболее свойственной чертой детерминации человеческого поведе­
ния. Тут связывается прошлое и будущее в процессе детерминации. Таким образом 
мероприятия, принятые в ходе привлечения липа к уголовной ответственности за 
его поведения в прошлом, применяются и интересах благоприятной детерминации 
будущего.
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